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NOTE
Is THERE

A DUTY?: LIMITING COLLEGE

AND UNIVERSITY LIABILITY FOR
STUDENT SUICIDE
Susanna G. Dyer*

This Note argues that nonclinician administratorsemployed by institutions
of higher education do not have a special relationship with their students
such that they have a duty to act with reasonable care to prevent a foreseeable student suicide. Courts that have in recent years ruled to the contrary
have done so by incorrectly basing their duty-of-care analysis on foreseeability of harm alone. With an eye toward a proper duty-of-care analysis,
this Note analyzes multiple factors to reach its conclusion, including the
ideal relationshipbetween colleges and their students and the burden on
and capabilityof colleges to protect their studentsfrom a particularharm.
Moreover public policy concerns weigh heavily against imposing a duty
on nonclinician university administrators. This Note further argues that
the tort doctrine of negligent performance of affirmative duties undertaken
provides a better framework within which to assess the liability of institutions of higher educationfor student suicides by holding those institutions
responsible for egregious missteps regarding student mental health problems. Liability pursuant to negligent performance of affirmitive duties
undertaken requires that colleges and universities implement and operate
their programs with due care, but leaves sufficient latitude for individual
colleges and universities to explore suicide prevention techniques that are
effective and feasible in light of their student body, resources, and overall
educationalphilosophy.
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INTRODUCTION

In February of 1999, Nina Davis-Millis, a librarian at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology ("MIT"), served as a housemaster at the Random
Hall dormitory on MIT's campus.' In her role as housemaster, Davis-Millis
learned that Elizabeth Shin, a first-year student who lived in Random Hall,
had been admitted to McLean Hospital for a one-week psychiatric hospitalization after overdosing on Tylenol with codeine. With Elizabeth's
permission, Davis-Millis informed Elizabeth's parents that she was in the
hospital. 3 Although Elizabeth, in consultation with her father, declined a
doctor's recommendation to seek treatment outside of the university, she did
agree to meet with an MIT psychiatrist periodically for the remainder of the
academic year.4
Elizabeth's psychological problems continued when she returned to MIT
and Random Hall for her sophomore year. In March of 2000, a student noti-

1.

Shin v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 19 Mass. L. Rptr. 570, 570 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2005).

2.

Id.

3.

Id.

4.

Id. at 571.
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fled Davis-Millis that Elizabeth was cutting herself.5 Davis-Millis persuaded
Elizabeth to seek treatment at MIT's mental health facilities, and, with Elizabeth's consent, contacted her parents to inform them of their daughter's
continuing problems. 6 Elizabeth's parents took Elizabeth home for spring
break, but after she returned to campus her mental condition continued to
deteriorate despite an antidepressant regimen and counseling sessions with
various MIT psychiatrists. 7 From late March through early April, DavisMillis kept in contact with an MIT dean about Elizabeth's condition and,
presumably in order to be able to continue monitoring Elizabeth, discouraged her from moving out of Random Hall.8
On April 8, 2000 MIT campus police brought Elizabeth to MIT's medical health center after she threatened to kill herself with a knife. 9 The on-call
psychiatrist determined that Elizabeth was not acutely suicidal and released
her.' o When late the following night two Random Hall students informed
Davis-Millis that Elizabeth had again threatened suicide, the housemaster
sought the advice of the psychiatrist who had treated Elizabeth the previous
day." Per the doctor's instruction, Davis-Millis checked on Elizabeth that
night.' 2 On the morning of April 10, Davis-Millis conferred with the dean
about Elizabeth. 3 At an 11:00 a.m. meeting, MIT deans and psychiatrists
discussed Elizabeth's situation and decided that Elizabeth would attend an
appointment the next day to begin off-campus behavioral therapy treatment. 4 Later that night, Random Hall students discovered a fire in
Elizabeth's 6 room. 5 Elizabeth died of "self-inflicted thermal bums" some
days later.1
Elizabeth's parents sued MIT, its medical professionals, and its nonclinician administrators-including Davis-Millis-for failing to prevent
Elizabeth's suicide. 7 On Davis-Millis's motion for summary judgment, the
Massachusetts Superior Court ruled that because Davis-Millis could have
foreseen Elizabeth's suicide, the housemaster had a special relationship with
Elizabeth and therefore owed her a duty to exercise reasonable care to

5.

Id.

6.

Id.

7.

Id. at 571-72.

8.

See id. at 572.

9.

Id.

10.

Id.

11.

Id.

12.

Id. at 572-73.

13.

Id. at 573.

14.

ld.

15.

Id.

16.

Id.

17.

Id. at 578 n.l.
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prevent her suicide." MIT settled the lawsuit with the Shins before the question of whether Davis-Millis had breached that duty reached a jury.'9
As in Shin, a federal district court in Virginia held in Schieszler v. Ferrum College that a dean and resident advisor had a duty to exercise
reasonable care to prevent a student's suicide. 0 In Schieszler, a Ferrum College student named Frentzel committed suicide in his dorm room."
Frentzel's personal representative sued the college, a dean, and a dormitory
resident assistant for wrongful death.22 The plaintiff claimed that the defendants were " 'negligent by failing to take adequate precautions to insure that
Frentzel did not hurt himself.' ,21 Prior to Frentzel's suicide, the dean and
resident assistant had noticed Frentzel had self-inflicted bruises and made
Frentzel sign a statement that he would not hurt himself. 24 After signing the
statement, Frentzel wrote two notes to his girlfriend implying he planned to
commit suicide.25 By the time the dean and resident assistant responded to
26
the second note, however, Frentzel had hanged himself in his dorm room.
The Shin and Schieszler courts' holdings deviated from previous cases
holding that nonclinicians do not have a duty to exercise reasonable care to
27
prevent suicide. With some exceptions, plaintiffs claiming liability for a
loved one's suicide generally fail to establish that defendants owed the deceased a duty to prevent his or her suicide." Tort law does not assign
defendants an affirmative duty to prevent foreseeable harm absent a special
relationship.' 9 The Shin and Schieszler courts seemingly brushed aside this
rule of no affirmative duty by holding that the nonclinician defendants had a
special relationship with Elizabeth-and thus owed her a duty of caresolely because her suicide was foreseeable.

18.

Id.at 577.

19.

Marcella Bombardieri, MIT Relatives Settle Suit over Student Suicide in '01, BOSTON

GLOBE, Sept. 2, 2006, at B3.

20.

236 F Supp. 2d 602, 609 (W.D. Va. 2002).

21.

Id. at 605.

22.

Id.

23.

Id.

24.

Id.

25.

Id.

26.

Id.

27. E.g., Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 964 (Cal. 1988) (holding
that a church's nontherapist counselors had no duty to prevent suicide); Bogust v. Iverson, 102
N.W.2d 228, 230 (Wis. 1960) (holding that a college director of student personnel did not owe the
same duty of care to prevent student suicide as did a trained medical professional).
28. E.g., McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 461 A.2d 123, 127 (N.H. 1983) (discussing the exceptions
that apply in the contexts of jails and hospitals and between patients and psychiatrists).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314, 314A (1965). Additionally, lawsuits alleging
liability for suicides historically failed to establish causation because the suicidal person was
deemed to be the sole proximate cause of his or her own death. E.g., McLaughlin, 461 A.2d at 124
("As a general rule, negligence actions seeking damages for the suicide of another will not lie because the act of suicide is considered a deliberate, intentional and intervening act which precludes a
finding that a given defendant, in fact, is responsible for the harm.").
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While college students are actually less likely to commit suicide than
noncollege students in the same age range, student suicide is the secondmost common cause of college student death; approximately 1100 college
students commit suicide each year.30 Further, college counselors have in recent years reported an increase in the number of students diagnosed with
severe psychological problems.3 In 2005, for example, ninety-five percent
of college counseling directors nationwide reported an increase in the number of college students who were already on psychiatric medication when
they came to the counseling center for assistance.32
Because the number of pending lawsuits against institutions of higher
education is significant,33 colleges and universities have struggled to balance
their students' best interests against their own interest in avoiding liability
for student suicide, and higher education attorneys and administrators worry
about the potential implications of the Shin court's legal analysis.34 Should a
foreseeability analysis alone impose upon nonclinician administrators a duty
to prevent student suicide, institutions of higher education may strategically
alter their approach to student mental health issues in a way that negatively
affects their students' mental health.35 After Shin, colleges fear that "any
program to increase student safety may also increase the institution's liability.''36 Because most programs aimed at reaching out to students with severe
mental health problems will involve college administrators learning specific
details about students' problems, any subsequent student suicide is more
likely to be viewed by a court as having been foreseeable to that administrator. Institutions, then, may judge that the safer course from a riskmanagement perspective is to avoid foreseeability-generated liability by not
offering such programs at all.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts includes several sections that are
helpful in understanding the legal doctrines discussed in this Note. First, as
the Shin and Schieszler decisions demonstrate, whether institutions of
higher education ("IHEs") have an affirmative duty to protect students from
harm is a key question in determining IHE liability for student suicide.

30.

Karen W. Arenson, Worried Colleges Step Up Efforts Over Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,

2004, at A 1;see also Peter F Lake, Private Law Continues to Come to Campus: Rights and Respon-

sibilities Revisited, 31 J.C. & U.L. 621, 656 (2005) ("The most significant and salient phenomenon
of the current wellness crisis on campus is suicide.").
31.

Elizabeth Fried Ellen, Suicide Preventionon Campus, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Oct. 2002, at

1, http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/p021001a.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2008).
32. Lynette Clemetson, Off to College on Their Own, Shadowed by Mental Illness, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2006, at Al.
33.

Ann H. Franke, When Students Kill Themselves, Colleges May Get the Blame, CHRON.

OF HIGHER EDuC., June 25, 2004, at B18 (reporting that as of June 2004, ten suicide cases were
pending against institutions of higher education).
34. See Brief of Amici Curiae Brown University et al. in Support of Petition for Relief under
G.L. c. 231, § 118 (First Paragraph) by MIT Administrators Arnold Henderson and Nina DavisMillis at 7, Shin v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., No. 2006-J-0099 (Mass. App. Ct. Feb. 24, 2006).
35.

See, e.g., Franke, supra note 33.

36.

Id.
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Restatement section 314, Duty to Act for Protection of Others, provides the
baseline rule that a person does not have an affirmative duty to protect an-

other person from harm or aid another person in danger.37 Restatement
section 314A, Special Relations Giving Rise to Duty to Aid or Protect, of-

fers some special relationships that will give rise to an affirmative duty to
aid or protect.3 s Importantly, the Restatement neither provides an exhaustive
list of which relationships are "special" nor details how courts determine
whether a special relationship exists. Second, IHEs may incur liability in
certain cases of student suicide even if no such affirmative duty exists. According to Restatement section 323, Negligent Performance of Undertaking
to Render Services, a person can be liable to another person if he or she,

having voluntarily undertaken to help that person, fails to exercise reasonable care in providing the assistance undertaken. 9
This Note argues that nonclinician administrators employed by IHEs do

not have a special relationship with their students such that they have a duty
to act with reasonable care to prevent a foreseeable student suicide. Instead,
IHEs should be liable for increased risk to students if they fail to use due
care to administer suicide-prevention programs that they do provide. Part I

provides background on liability for suicide at common law and discusses
the duties that courts have imposed and continue to impose upon IHEs to
prevent various foreseeable harms, including suicide. Part II argues that

courts holding that IHEs' nonclinician administrators have a special relationship with their students, solely because a suicide was foreseeable,
incorrectly applied the tort principles of duty of care. It also argues that pub37. The section states: "The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his
part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take
such action." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
38.

The section states:

(1)

A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reasonable action
to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and
to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that they are ill or injured, and
to care for them until they can be cared for by others.
An innkeeper is under a similar duty to his guests.
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a similar duty to members of
the public who enter in response to his invitation.
One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of another under
circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal opportunities for protection is
under a similar duty to the other.

(a)
(b)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Id. § 314A.
39.

The section states:

One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he
should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to
perform his undertaking, if
(a)
(b)
Id. § 323.

his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.
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lic policy concerns weigh heavily against imposing such a duty on IHE administrators. Part III contends that the tort doctrine of negligent performance
of affirmative duties undertaken provides a better framework within which
to assess the liability of IHEs for student suicides. Finally, it proposes illustrations to be added to Restatement sections 314A and 323 that would
clarify how courts should evaluate IHE and administrator liability for student suicide.
I.

HISTORICAL LIABILITY FOR SUICIDE AND INSTITUTIONAL
LIABILITY IN GENERAL

This Part provides the legal backdrop against which the issue of whether
foreseeability generates a duty to prevent student suicide emerged. Section
L.A discusses the common law's general reluctance to impose liability for
suicide, but it also notes exceptions to that rule when a special relationship
exists between the defendant and the victim. Section I.B sketches the historical development of the legal duties IHEs owe to their students. It
discusses two distinct ways in which courts analyze IHEs' liability for student suicide, including the approach that has resulted in two holdings that
IHEs' nonclinician administrators have a duty to exercise reasonable care to
prevent foreseeable student suicide.
A. Liabilityfor Suicide at Common Law
While the common law did not impose civil liability for a failure to prevent suicide, the law has evolved to make room for such liability in limited
circumstances.4 0 Under a traditional tort analysis, courts deemed the suicidal
person to be the sole proximate cause of his or her own death, and the law
did not impose affirmative duties on others to prevent foreseeable harm.4' An
exception to this no-duty rule emerged under the tort doctrine of special re42
lationships. Restatement section 314A states that common carriers,
innkeepers, landowners, and those who have custody of another person have
a duty to take reasonable action to aid or protect that person. 43 A comment
accompanying section 314A clarifies that "It]he relations listed are not intended to be exclusive," and, in fact, "[t]he law appears ...to be working
slowly toward a recognition of the duty to aid or protect in any relation of

40.

See McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 461 A.2d 123, 124 (N.H. 1983).

41.

See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 314

("The fact that the actor real-

izes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of
itself impose upon him a duty to take such action.").
42. In addition to the special relationship exception, courts have recognized an exception
when the defendant actually caused the suicide. McLaughlin, 461 A.2d at 124. Although this exception is beyond the scope of this Note, see, for example, Wallace v. Broyles, 961 S.W.2d 712 (Ark.
1998), for a denial of a university's motion for summary judgment where there was a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the university dispensed controlled drugs to decedent, thereby contributing to or causing his suicide.
43.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A.
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dependence or of mutual dependence." 4 As previously noted, the Restatement does not further clarify how courts determine whether a special
relationship exists.
Courts have most commonly recognized a special relationship-which
creates a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the suicide-in the contexts of jails and hospitals and between patients and psychiatrists. 45 In jails
and hospitals, the defendant has "actual physical custody of and control over
,,46
persons. In relationships between patients and trained mental health professionals, the professionals are "deemed to have a special training and
expertise enabling them to detect mental illness and/or the potential for suicide, and ...the power or control necessary to prevent that suicide. 47
Courts have generally been reluctant to extend the special relationships duty
48
to prevent suicide to noncustodial, nonprofessional counselor relationships.
B. Duties Institutions of Higher Education Owe to Their Students
This Section describes how the approach courts have taken regarding the
relationship between IHEs and their students has changed over the last century. Section I.B.1 examines the mid-twentieth-century shift away from an
in loco parentis relationship to a "bystander" relationship, but notes that
neither analysis imposed liability on IHEs. Section I.B.2 discusses how,
more recently, some courts have demonstrated a new willingness to assign
more protective duties to IHEs and examines a divide in the case law with
respect to whether IHEs have a duty to prevent student suicide.
1. HistoricalParadigmsof InstitutionalRelationships with and
Duties to Students
Until the last half-century, the doctrine of in loco parentis dictated
courts' vision of the proper relationship between IHEs and their students.
Literally translated, in loco parentis means "in place of a parent. ' 49 Under
this paradigm, the college or university took the place of the father in the
44.

Id., cmt. b.

45.

See, e.g., McLaughlin, 461 A.2d at 125.

46.

Id.

47.

Id.

48. See, e.g., Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 956-60 (Cal. 1988)
(holding that a church's nontherapist counselors had no duty to prevent suicide and that mere toreseeability is not enough to create a special relationship). Some have argued, without success, that
the law should impose a duty to prevent suicide broadly across society, even in the absence of a
special relationship. See Charles J. Williams, Fault and the Suicide Victim: When Third PartiesAssume a Suicide Victim's Duty of Self-Care, 76 NEB. L. REv. 301 (1997) (arguing that liability for a
person's suicide should be analyzed with a comparative fault analysis); Kate E. Bloch, Note, The
Role of Law in Suicide Prevention:Beyond Civil Commitment-A Bystander Dun , to Report Suicide
Threats, 39 STAN. L. REV. 929 (1987) (arguing that law should impose a general duty to report
serious suicidal threats).
49. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 803 (8th ed. 2004) ("Of, relating to, or acting as a temporary guardian or caretaker of a child, taking on all or some of the responsibilities of a parent.").
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lives of its students. As a result, courts in most circumstances gave great
deference to the decisions of IHEs regarding their students, as they would
defer to a parent's decision regarding his or her child.50 The effect of the in
loco parentis doctrine was to shield IHEs from liability by allowing courts
to "avoid[] judging the reasonableness of decisions by college authorities.""
While the cases discussing in loco parentis "protected a college's exercise of
authority over the students," they did not "specifically address college tort
liability." Prior to the 1960s, there were very few cases dealing with tort liability on college campuses at all."
In the 1960s, the courts began viewing the relationship among IHEs,
their students, and their students' parents as contractual rather than parental.5" The shift was grounded at least in part on a growing recognition of
college students as bona fide adults. Courts now generally accept that the
law does "not expect colleges to play a role as surrogate parents. 5 4 Thus,
between the 1960s and 1980s, in what has been labeled the "era of the 'bystander' university,"
IHEs owed no duty to students unless they "voluntarily
55
assumed it.",
2. Recent Developments: Courts Divided on Institutional Liability for
Student Safety
Although courts rarely imposed tort liability on IHEs during the in loco
parentis and bystander eras, courts met increasing media and legislative attention to college-student deaths in the 1980s and 1990s with an increased
predisposition to find that colleges and universities owed their students a
56
duty of protection from certain specific harms. Particularly in two contexts-violent crime and hazing activities-courts have found that IHEs
have a special relationship with, and a duty to protect, their students.57 On
50. Jane A. Dall, Note, Determining Duty in Collegiate Tort Litigation: Shifting Paradigms
of the College-Student Relationship, 29 J.C. & U.L. 485, 487-88 (2003).
51.

ld. at 489.

52. Id. at 489. The court further asserted that "[ilf the doctrine of in loco parentis had any
effect on college tort liability in the pre-modem era, it would appear to be that of limitation." Id. at
489-90.
53.

Id. at 493.

54. Benefield v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1220
(N.D. Ala. 2002). The court stated:
Clearly, college students are uniquely different from high school, junior high school and elementary school students. This court can find no notice to the defendant from which it should
have been aware it stood in loco parentis, nor does the court believe the creation of such a duty
is in the public interest.

Id.
55.

Dall, supra note 50, at 491.

56.

Id. at 501.

57. In Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 449 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1983), for example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that that the College had a special relationship with students
and thus had a duty to provide security for its students in a lawsuit for injuries resulting when a

1388

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 106:1379

the other hand, courts have remained reluctant to assign IHEs a duty to prevent harm resulting from drug or alcohol use.5 8
Student suicide is another area in which courts have imposed increased
institutional liability. Both the Massachusetts Superior Court and the United

States District Court for the Western District of Virginia recently held that
nonclinician college administrators and residence-life staff could have a special relationship with their students and a corresponding duty to exercise
reasonable care to prevent suicide, at least in particular factual circumstances.5 9 In Schieszler v. Ferrum College, a student committed suicide after
a college dean and a resident advisor made him sign a statement that he
would not hurt himself. 60 The district court concluded that a special relationship existed consistent with Restatement section 314A between the

deceased, his resident advisor, and his dean because a jury could find that
there was "an imminent probability" that the deceased might undertake selfinjurious behavior.6 In Shin v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the
Massachusetts Superior Court found sufficient evidence that the deceased's
dean and housemaster "could reasonably foresee" that Shin would hurt herself, and therefore it found a special relationship between these MIT
administrators and the deceased under Restatement section 314A.62
Despite the Shin and Schieszler holdings, IHE nonclinician duty to prevent student suicide is far from a well-established rule. Recently, courts have
relied on Restatement section 323 to deny recovery to the families of students who committed suicide.63 Under Restatement section 323, the
defendant is only responsible for the increased risk created by his or her
failure to use due care. 64 Relying on this section, these courts found that the

university nonclinician-defendants were not liable because they had not increased the risk of suicide or withdrawn services on which the suicidal

student was raped on campus. In Knoll v. Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska, 601
N.W.2d 757 (Neb. 1999), the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the university owed a duty to its
students to prevent harm resulting from fraternity hazing activities that included abducting and
handcuffing a student.
58. E.g., Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 138 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding a university had
no duty to control the conduct of a student who drank alcohol at a university event); Baldwin v.
Zoradi, 176 Cal. Rptr. 809 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (finding a university had no duty to control the
alcoholic intake of their students in a lawsuit for injures arising out of a car-racing contest following
a drinking party).
59. Schieszler v. Ferrum Coll., 236 F Supp. 2d 602 (W.D. Va. 2002); Shin v. Mass. Inst. of
Tech., 19 Mass. L. Rptr. 570, 577 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2005).
60.

236 F. Supp. 2d at 609. For a discussion of the facts of the case, see this Note's Introduc-

61.

Id. at 606-07,609.

tion.
62.
duction.

19 Mass. L. Rptr. at 577. For a discussion of the facts of the case, see this Note's Intro-

63. See Jain v. State, 617 N.W.2d 293, 299-300 (Iowa 2000) (granting summary judgment
for the college and its nonclinician administrators where parents sued for negligence, alleging defendants' failure to exercise reasonable care to prevent their adult-child's suicide); Mahoney v.
Allegheny Coll., No. AD 892-2003, slip op. at 22 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 22, 2005).
64.

DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 861-62 (2001).
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student had relied. Particularly because the Restatement section 314A and
section 323 approaches have yielded such different results, it may be difficult for IHEs to predict how courts will view nonclinician liability for
student suicide and, therefore, how they can simultaneously attend to their
students' health and protect the institution from liability.
II. INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION

Do

NOT HAVE A DUTY OF CARE

TO PREVENT STUDENT SUICIDE

This Part argues that, having applied a proper duty-of-care analysis,
courts should not find that a special relationship exists between IHE administrators and their students. Section II.A asserts that a multifactor duty-ofcare analysis, based on the various policy concerns raised by the particular
facts of a case, is the proper method for determining whether a special relationship exists between an IHE and a student. Section 11.B argues that the
Shin and Schieszler courts wrongly based their finding of a special relationship on a single factor: foreseeability. Section II.C contends that the proper
multifactor duty-of-care analysis and policy considerations weigh against
imposing a special relationship on IHE nonclinicians to prevent foreseeable
student suicides.
A. Determining Whether a Special Relationship Exists Requires a
Multifactor Duty-of-CareAnalysis
This Section outlines the multifactor analysis that courts employ to determine whether a duty of care exists outside the context of special
relationships, and argues that courts should extend the multifactor analysis
to determinations of whether or not to impose a duty based on a special relationship. This Section demonstrates that courts generally apply a duty-ofcare analysis to IHEs that extends beyond foreseeability of harm to also examine the appropriate relationship between IHEs and their adult students
and the burden on and capability of IHEs to effectively perform the responsibilities courts may impose upon them.
In tort cases generally, whether a defendant owed a plaintiff a duty of
care is essentially a policy decision for the court. As one court stated, "legal
duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for
damage done." 66 Professor Prosser explained, "'duty is not sacrosanct in
itself,'" but is rather "'only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to
protection.' , 67 Finally, in his treatise on torts, Professor Dobbs reasons that

65.

Jain, 617 N.W.2d at 299-300; Mahoney, No. AD 892-2003, slip op. at 22.

66.

Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976).

67.

DOBBS, supra note 64, at 582 (quoting WILLIAM

LLOYD PROSSER & PAGE KEETON,

PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54 (5th ed. 1984)).
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"duty should be constructed by courts from building blocks of policy and
justice.""
Courts weigh a number of factors to determine whether a defendant
owed a plaintiff a duty of care in any particular case. In Rowland v. Christian, the court cited the following "major" factors:
[F]oreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the
defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the
burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a
duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability,
cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. 69
Similarly, Professor Dobbs listed numerous factors to be considered:
(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff,
(2) the foreseeability of harm to him, (3) the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the closeness of the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, (5) the moral blame attached
to the defendant's conduct, (6) the policy of preventing future harm by deterrence, and (7) administrative factors, including the feasibility of
administering a rule that imposed a duty. To this list can be added (8) the
relationship of the parties and the customs to which they jointly subscribe.7°
Thus, while the application of some or all of the aforementioned factors
may differ from case to case, courts and commentators generally agree that
foreseeability of harm is but one factor to be evaluated in determining
whether a duty of care exists.
The term "special relationship" has been a source of confusion; courts
sometimes conflate duty of care and special relationship, but at other times
treat them as separate doctrines. Certain relationships-such as that between
an innkeeper and a guest, or between hospital administrators and their patients-have clearly been established as "special relationships" as a matter
of law.7 In general, however, courts have not established a coherent method
for determining when a relationship is "special" such that a defendant owes
an affirmative duty to aid or protect another person where no such duty
would otherwise exist.72 A "special relationship" should not be thought of as
a reference to some identifiable list of relationships in which an affirmative
duty automatically exists. Rather, "special relationship" is a category that
courts can assign when they specifically determine that a duty of care
68.

Id.

69.

443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968).

70.

DOBBS,

supra note 64, at 582 (citations omitted).

71.
RESTATEMENT
nying text.

(SECOND) OF TORTS §

314A (1965); see supra notes 45-48 and accompa-

72. See, e.g., Schieszler v. Ferrum Coll., 236 F. Supp. 2d 602, 609 (W.D. Va. 2002); Shin v.
Mass. Inst. of Tech., 19 Mass. L. Rptr. 570, 576-77 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2005).
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should exist in a particular set of circumstances. Restatement section 314A
states that, in certain relationships-for example, the relationship between
an innkeeper and a guest-courts have performed a duty-of-care analysis by
weighing factors such as those listed above, and this analysis has resulted in
favor of imposing a duty.73 Courts should then apply a multifactor duty-ofcare analysis to determine whether there is a special relationship, as many
already have.
One court has applied a multifactor duty-of-care analysis to determine
whether a duty-of-care or special relationship existed in the student suicide
context. In Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, the plaintiffs
sued nonmedical church counselors for failing to prevent their son's suicide. 74 To determine whether the nonclinician counselor defendants owed the
plaintiffs' son a duty-of-care, the Supreme Court of California analyzed a set
of factors similar to those listed by Professor Dobbs75 and found that the
counselors did not owe a duty. 76 The court stated that "[m]ere foreseeability
of the harm or knowledge of the danger[] is insufficient to create a legally
cognizable special relationship giving rise to a legal duty to prevent harm. 77
Courts analyzing whether IHEs owe their students a duty of care in nonsuicide cases have identified factors to be evaluated in the IHE context
specifically. For example, in Baldwin v. Zoradi, a California court applied
several of Professor Dobbs's factors.78 In considering the foreseeability of
the harm, the moral blameworthiness of the defendants, the policy of preventing future harm, the burden on the defendant, the consequences to the
community of imposing a duty, and whether or not imposition of the duty is
in the best interests of society,79 the court articulated the ultimate question
regarding duty: "'[W]hether the risk of harm is sufficiently high and the
amount of activity needed to protect against harm sufficiently low to bring
the duty into existence .
'...,
,80 Thus, an IHE's interest in avoiding duties
that it could not realistically sustain weighed heavily in the court's analysis
of whether the IHE had a duty in the first place."' Applying this test to the
facts of the case, the court held that the university did not owe a duty 2to its
students to protect them from injuries resulting from alcohol ingestion.s

73.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

74.

763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988).

§ 314A.

75.

See supra note 70 and accompanying text.

76.

Nally, 763 P.2d at 956-61.

77.

Id. at 959.

78.

176 Cal. Rptr. 809, 812-19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).

79. Id. at 815-19. Although the court found that foreseeability was "central" to the duty
determination, it found that "a concomitant duty to prevent the [foreseeable] harm does not always
follow." Id. at 816.
80. Id. at 816 (quoting Bartell v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Sch. Dist., 147 Cal. Rptr. 898, 902
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978)).
81.

Id.

82.

Id. at 815-16.
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A recent Massachusetts case highlights another factor courts evaluate to
determine whether an IHE has a duty to protect its students. The court in
Bash v. Clark University unequivocally stated that "foreseeability of
physical harm is not the linchpin for determining the existence of a common-law duty under Massachusetts tort law.' 83 Instead, the court should
"'look to existing social values and customs, and to appropriate social policy.' ,,84 The plaintiff in Bash brought a wrongful death action against Clark
University and various university officials and deans after his daughter died
of a heroin overdose while a freshman at the university.85 The court balanced
"the foreseeability of harm with what steps would be necessary to protect
,,16
students. Ultimately, the court found that the university had no duty because given "the challenges faced by university officials and staff in
attempting to eradicate drug use on college campuses, recognizing a special
relationship in this instance would impose on university officials and staff
an unreasonable burden
that would be at odds with contemporary social val87
ues and customs.
Courts determining whether a duty exists in the IHE context also consider contemporary social values and customs regarding the ideal
relationship between IHEs and students. The Third Circuit examined the
contemporary social values and customs factor in Bradshaw v. Rawlings. 81
In that case, a student sued his university for injuries he suffered in a car
accident with a fellow student driver who had become intoxicated at a university event.89 The court evaluated the parties' interests to determine
whether the university owed the plaintiff a duty of care: the plaintiff's interest was freedom from bodily injury, while the university's interest was "in
the nature of its relationship with its adult students, as well as an interest in
avoiding responsibilities that it is incapable of performing." 9 Starting from
the premise that "the modem American college is not an insurer of the safety of its students," 9' the court considered the ways in which the policy
considerations surrounding the duty determination had changed in recent
decades. 92 Higher education jurisprudence, the court emphasized, had
moved away from in loco parentis as society had increasingly recognized

83.

22 Mass. L. Rptr. 84, 86 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2006).

84. Bash, 22 Mass. L. Rptr. at 86 (quoting Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536
N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (Mass. 1989)).
85.

Id. at 84.

86.

Id. at 86.

87. Id. The Bash court cited the Schieszler and Shin opinions with approval because it regarded suicide as entailing a different set of considerations than drug abuse. This Note argues that
this different set of considerations in fact weighs against imposing a duty on IHEs to prevent student
suicide. See infra Section I.C.
88.

612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979).

89.

Bradshaw, 612 F2d at 137.

90.

Id. at 138.

91.

Id.

92.

Id. at 138-39.
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that college students were adults with their own rights and privileges." In
assessing whether it shculd find a duty of care, then, the court was persuaded that students remain free to "define and regulate their own lives. 94
The court held that the university did not have a special relationship with its
students, and therefore did not owe them a duty of care under the circumstances.95

B. The Shin and Schieszler Courts Incorrectly Concluded that a
Special Relationship Existed Solely Because the Students'Suicides
Were Foreseeable
Despite the strong support for courts' use of a multifactor analysis to determine whether a duty of care exists-thus affirming the presence of a
special relationship-the two recent cases that have imposed a duty on IHE
nonclinicians to prevent student suicide relied exclusively on the foreseeability factor. The court in Shin determined that Elizabeth Shin's dean and
housemaster had a special relationship with her because her suicide was
96
foreseeable to them. As a result, they had a duty to protect her from selfinflicted harm.97 Similarly, the Schieszler court concluded that a special relationship existed between a student and the nonclinician defendants because
there was an "imminent probability" that the student would commit suicide. 98
The Shin and Schieszler opinions exemplify the confusion surrounding
the doctrine of special relationships. The Shin court's analysis of whether a
duty of care existed between the MIT administrators and Elizabeth began by
citing Restatement section 314A's rule that where there is a "special relationship," a defendant might owe an affirmative duty to the plaintiff where
none would otherwise exist under Restatement section 314.99 The court,
however, did not provide a coherent framework for or explanation of how
courts should determine whether a special relationship exists.'0° The court
cited a case for the proposition that special relationships "'are based to a
large extent on a uniform set of considerations,'" of which foreseeability is
foremost.' 0' At another point, the court cited a case that determined whether
a duty of care existed by reference to "'existing social values and customs'"

93.

Id. at 138-40.

94.

Id. at 140.

95.

Id. at 141-43.

96. Shin v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 19 Mass. L. Rptr 570, 577 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2005). For the
facts of the Shin case, see this Note's Introduction, supra.
97.

Id.

98. Schieszler v. Ferrum Coll., 236 F. Supp. 2d 602, 609 (W.D. Va. 2002). For the facts of
the Schieszler case, see this Note's Introduction, supra.
99.

Shin, 19 Mass. L. Rptr. at 576.

100.

Id. at 577.

101.

Id. (quoting Irwin v. Town of Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292, 1300 (Mass. 1984)).
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and without reference to the doctrine of special relationships. In citing to
both precedents, the court seemed to acknowledge that in determining if
there was a duty of care-whether the court named that duty a special relationship or not-it was advisable to consider more than mere
foreseeability. But the Shin court then concluded something entirely different-that the foreseeability of harm established the special relationship. The
court stated:
The Plaintiffs have provided sufficient evidence that [the Administrators]
could reasonably foresee that Elizabeth would hurt herself without proper
supervision. Accordingly, there was a 'special relationship' between the
MIT Administrators... and Elizabeth imposing a duty on [the Administrators] to exercise reasonable care to protect Elizabeth from harm.' 0 3
Similarly, the Schieszler court cited precedent that indicated it should
apply a multifactor test to determine duty, but then failed to analyze any
factors other than foreseeability. More specifically, the court explained that,
"'[in determining whether a duty exists' ... 'the likelihood of injury, the
magnitude of the burden of guarding against it, and the consequences of
placing that burden on the defendant must be taken into account.' ,4 The
court's holding, however, was in stark contrast to the test it set out:
Based on these alleged facts, a trier of fact could conclude that there was
"an imminent probability" that Frentzel would try to hurt himself, and that
the defendants had notice of this specific harm. Thus, I find that the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support her claim that a special
relationship existed between Frentzel and defendants giving rise to a duty
to protect Frentzel from the foreseeable danger that he would hurt himself.' 5
Thus, the Schieszler court merely made a post hoc evaluation of the foreseeability of Frentzel's suicide, on which it based the finding of a special
relationship.'06
By concluding that foreseeability created a special relationship, 1 7 the
Shin and Schieszler courts essentially rendered the basic tort doctrine of no
affirmative duties null and void. Restatement section 314 specifically states
that "rt]he fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part
is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon
him a duty to take such action."'08 Thus, to say a special relationship, and

102.

Id. (quoting Mullins v. Pine Manor Coll., 449 N.E.2d 331, 335 (Mass. 1983)).

103.

Id.

104. Schieszler v. Ferrum Coll., 236 E Supp. 2d 602, 609 (W.D. Va. 2002) (quoting Wright v.
Webb, 362 S.E.2d 919, 921 (Va. 1987)).
105.

Id.

106.

Id.

107.

Shin, 19 Mass. L. Rptr. at 577; Schieszler, 236 F Supp. 2d at 609.

108.
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therefore duty of care, exists whenever a harm is foreseeable would render
Restatement section 314 meaningless.
C. A Proper MultifactorAnalysis and Public Policy Support
the Conclusion that InstitutionalNoncliniciansShould Not
Have a Legal Duty to Prevent Student Suicide
This Section applies a multifactor duty-of-care analysis to IHE liability
for student suicide. It examines not only the foreseeability factor, but also
the nature of the appropriate relationship between IHEs and their adult students, the burden on IHEs ordered to carry out court-imposed duties, and the
abilities of IHEs and their administrators to take prospective steps to protect
students from harm. It concludes that institutional nonclinicians should not
have a duty to prevent student suicide.
The Shin and Schieszler courts engaged in an incorrect analysis of the
foreseeability factor because suicide is difficult to predict. The American
Psychiatric Association's guidelines for assessing patients with suicidal behavior reports that while only 0.7% of the United States population attempts
suicide and 0.01% of the U.S. population actually completes suicide, 5.6%
of the population engages in suicidal ideation. "9 According to the report,
"[t]his rarity of suicide, even in groups known to be at higher risk than the
general population, contributes to the impossibility of predicting suicide."'
Experts explain that "suicidal acts are often impulsive," with "[m]ore than
half of suicide attempts occur[ing] within the context of a premeditation
period of less than five minutes. ' '" The facts of Shin itself sadly illustrate
the reality that even trained mental health professionals will not always accurately judge an individual's mental state. Two days before her suicide,
from the hospital because he
MIT's on-call psychiatrist sent Elizabeth home
' 2
suicidal."
"acutely
not
was
she
determined
Beyond foreseeability, the Shin and Schieszler courts should have evaluated the appropriate relationship between IHEs and their students in the
context of the law's abandonment of the in loco parentis doctrine." 3 As the
Bradshaw court clearly outlined, IHE jurisprudence has long since moved
away from the idea that college administrators should play a parental role in
the lives of their students and has moved toward a respect for students as
adults with their own rights, privileges, and responsibilities."' 4 Imposing a
duty of care on nonclinicians could force resident advisors, deans, and other
109. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, PRACTICE GUIDELINE FOR THE ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT
OF PATIENTS WITH SUICIDAL BEHAVIORS 12 (2003).
110.

Id.

Ill.

KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, NIGHT FALLS FAST: UNDERSTANDING

112.

Shin, 19 Mass. L. Rptr. at 570.

SUICIDE

189 (1999).

113. See Bash v. Clark Univ., 22 Mass. L. Rptr. 84, 87 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2006) ("The doctrine
of in loco parentis has no application to the relationship between a modern university and its students.").
114.

See Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 139-40 (3d Cir. 1979).
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administrators to monitor students' behavior in a manner inconsistent with
the current trend of recognizing and expanding students' privacy rights." 5
Moreover, imposing a duty of care on IHEs and their nonclinician administrators would be extremely burdensome, as they are not wellpositioned to prevent student suicide. As discussed above, suicide is extremely difficult to predict," 6 and nonclinicians do not have extensive
training or experience dealing with the issue. A White Paper on college student suicide prevention published by the Suicide Prevention Resource
Center described the challenge that colleges and universities face in the following way: "[T]here is no uniform definition for most suicidal behaviors,
including suicide attempts," and "[t]hus, whether a student's actions are to
be considered 'suicidal behavior' is often a judgment call-one that is often
' 7
not made by a mental health professional, but by an administrator.""
1 The
report explained that nonclinicians do not handle such assessments effectively because their lack of training in mental health can result in a blurring
of "[t]he concepts of intent, lethality, and temporality."' 8 The University of
Illinois, which has been uniquely successful in cutting its student suicide
rate in half since 1984, requires that any student who threatens or attempts
suicide attend "four sessions of professional assessment," presumably reflecting the university's judgment that professional treatment is necessary.119
Thus, because training in mental health is important to being able to predict
suicide, imposing a duty to prevent suicide on nonclinicians could burden
IHEs with the responsibility and cost of training all of their employees in
suicide prediction and prevention.
The various challenges IHEs face in their efforts to protect students from
crime and substance abuse further illustrate the poor positioning of college
administrators to prevent student suicide. The Mullins court explained that
colleges are fairly well-positioned to exercise reasonable care to keep students safe from violent crime on campus because they have "the ability to
design and implement a security system, hire and supervise security guards,
provide security at the entrance of dormitories, install proper locks, and establish a system of announcement for authorized visitors.' 2 ° In contrast,
courts have generally not imposed a duty on colleges to protect students
from the harmful effects of drug and alcohol use. This is in large part because "it would be difficult to so police a modem university campus as to

115. Baldwin v. Zoradi, 176 Cal. Rptr. 809, 816 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) ("Students have insisted
upon expanded rights of privacy .... ").
116.

See supra note 109 and accompanying text.

117.

SUICIDE PREVENTION RES. CTR., PROMOTING MENTAL HEALTH AND PREVENTING SUICIDE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY SETTINGS 21 (2004).

118.

Id.

119.

Id. at 22.

120.

Mullins v. Pine Manor Coll., 449 N.E.2d 331, 335 (Mass. 1983).

121.
E.g., Baldwin v. Zoradi, 176 Cal. Rptr. 809, 818 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Bash v. Clark
Univ., 22 Mass. L. Rptr. 84, 86-88 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2006).
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eradicate alcoholic ingestion.'1 2 While colleges can do much to improve
campus safety without intruding on students' privacy, such is not the case
with drug and alcohol use or self-injurious behavior.12 1 Moreover, the relationship between IHEs and their students in the context of the duty to
provide security on campus closely parallels the landlord-tenant relationship
outside the IHE context. Imposing a duty on colleges to protect students
against crime on campus is logical for the same reason that it is logical to
impose a duty on lessors to protect their lessees against crime in their
homes: IHEs and lessors alike are best positioned to provide such security.
While the IHE-student relationship in the security context parallels the landlord-tenant relationship, the nonclinician-student relationship in the context
of student suicide has no legal parallel from which to extend a special relationship and duty.
In addition to the multifactor analysis, broader public policy considerations weigh heavily against imposing a duty of care on nonclinician
administrators to prevent student suicide. Should courts impose such a duty,
administrators may overreact to student mental health problems or paradoxically discontinue efforts to reach out to troubled students. Presumably,
IHEs' first priority is the safety of their students; yet IHEs must also be cognizant of the need to avoid liability for student suicide. To avoid severe
liability, administrators may forcibly hospitalize students, mandate that students take a leave of absence, or discontinue outreach services altogether so
that suicides would no longer be foreseeable. MIT, for example, faced a
steep $27 million lawsuit for Elizabeth Shin's suicide. 24 As the amici curiae
brief of numerous colleges in the appeal of the Shin decision argued, a duty
to prevent suicide "creates incentives for non-clinicians to act in ways that
may be inconsistent with the judgment of treating clinicians.'2 2 The Shin
decision might make administrators or resident advisors "more likely to
press for the student's involuntary hospitalization" despite a mental health
clinician's determination that "hospitalization is not needed, and, indeed,
may even be detrimental.' 26 For specific students, mandatory leave could
"make it... impossible for the student to continue receiving treatment from
the mental-health clinicians who are familiar with his condition and who
can best evaluate, assess, and respond to his risk of suicide."'21 Further,
mandating that students with mental health problems enter treatment or take
medical leave "can dissuade other[] [students] from asking for help and

122.

Baldwin, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 818.

123. See Bash, 22 Mass. L. Rptr. at 87 ("The burden of protecting against the risks associated
with the illegal use of drugs is far more like the burden associated with maintaining the moral wellbeing of students than it is like the burden of protecting the physical integrity of dormitories.").
124. Ann H. Franke, while an insurer for IHEs, explained that suicide litigation has the potential to be extremely costly for colleges, "not to mention the emotional and reputational impact they
can have on a school." Arenson, supra note 30.
125.

Brief of Amici Curiae Brown University et al., supra note 34, at 8.

126.

Id.

127.

Id. at 9-10.
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discourage their friends from sounding the alarm."'2 8 Alternatively, colleges
have expressed fear that the Shin decision could cause nonclinicians to believe that "the better course ... would be to not become involved with a
student's mental problems" so as to avoid being subjected to a hindsightladen foreseeability analysis.29
Finally, if the Shin and Schieszler foreseeability analysis is enough to
impose a duty, it would be just as logical for a court to impose duties to prevent suicide on anyone to whom self-injurious behavior is more clearly
foreseeable.3 Courts could logically extend the foreseeability analysis to
impose duties on people who are more knowledgeable of a student's psychological state, such as a roommate, friend, professor, coach, or parent. Yet
imposing a duty on college and university employees, as well as friends and
family, to protect against such harms would likely signal a retreat from
modern IHE jurisprudence with respect to the abandonment of in loco parentis status and the recognition of students as responsible adults. And
allowing such parties to be sued for a failure to prevent a student's suicide
would fly in the face of tort law's ban on affirmative duties of protection in
general.
Ultimately, using a single-factor foreseeability analysis to impose a duty
on nonclinicians to prevent suicide results in one of two negative consequences: either it produces the anomaly that IHEs are singled out as
protectors against foreseeable harm, while those to whom the harm is more
clearly foreseeable are deemed not to owe a duty; or it produces a generallyapplicable foreseeability rule that runs counter to tort law's entire treatment
of affirmative duties and the modern conception of the role of an IHE.

III.

RESTATEMENT SECTION 323 AS A SAFETY NET AND PROPOSED
ILLUSTRATIONS TO RESTATEMENT SECTIONS

314A

AND

323

This Part argues that Restatement section 323 provides an alternative
framework under which to evaluate IHE liability for student suicide and
proposes several illustrations concerning IHE liability for student suicide for
inclusion in the Restatement. Section III.A explains that IHEs' suicide prevention programs will be most effective and practical when taking into
consideration the particular resources of the institution and characteristics of
the student body. The Section argues that courts can both allow IHEs the
freedom to implement population-specific programs and hold IHEs responsible for egregious missteps in administering those programs by employing
the rubric of negligent performance of undertaking to render services under

128.

Arenson, supra note 30.

129.

Brief of Amici Curiae Brown University et al., supra note 34, at 13.

130. One could also argue that courts could just as logically impose duties on administrators
and resident advisors to protect students from arguably more common types of danger, such as
binge drinking or the use of illicit or unprescribed prescription drugs to stay alert while studying.
Such behavior is no doubt foreseeable to nonclinician administrators, and in most instances it is
taking place just steps away from resident advisors.
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Restatement section 323. Section IIL.B proposes several illustrations for addition to Restatement sections 314A and 323. These illustrations seek to
guide courts in their decisions regarding the doctrines of special relationships and negligent performance of undertaking to render services, and how
to best apply them to actions for student suicide.
A. Holding Institutions of HigherEducation Liable for IncreasedRisk of
Student Suicide Under Restatement Section 323
The tort doctrine of negligent performance of affirmative duties undertaken provides a framework within which courts can hold IHEs liable for
any increase in risk of student suicide that an IHE program or administrator
causes. This Note does not argue that nonclinicians should not play an important role in preventing college student suicide. In fact, the "complex
problem of suicide and suicidal behaviors on campuses demands a multifaceted, collaborative, coordinated response, and cannot be left solely to
counselors and mental health centers."'' Instead, "[c]ollege administrators
need to ensure that all elements of the campus and community work together."'32 A recently released publication entitled Questions and Answers on
College Student Suicide noted that "rt]he key [to suicide reduction] is to
create a climate where talking about personal problems with a mental health
professional isn't stigmatized as some sort of failure. Outreach is essential,
especially where students live."'33
IHEs have chosen different methods for preventing suicide on their
campuses. While the positive results at the University of Illinois are likely
related to mandatory therapy,'34 some experts "fear that forcing students to
enter treatment or to take a medical leave can dissuade others from asking
for help and discourage their friends from sounding the alarm."'35 Further,
some colleges express concern that some of their students do not welcome
intervention. 1 6 Yet another contrast in IHEs' approaches to suicide reduction
is evident among strategies for identifying and reaching out to troubled students. At Duke University the Vice President for Student Affairs admits that
"he and members of the residence hall staff check up on the students, sometimes surreptitiously," by asking the residence hall staff to "'dispatch a
paraprofessional to inadvertently drop by a student's room as if it were a
casual encounter.'"'" Other colleges prefer to implement anonymous
131.

SUICIDE PREVENTION RES. CTR., supra note 117, at 25.

132.

Id.

133.
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134.

56 (2006).

See supra note 119 and accompanying text.

135. Arenson, supra note 30. For example, after Columbia University required that a bipolar
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Id.

137.

Id.
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internet mental health questionnaires to identify students that might need but
do not seek help."' Still other colleges, such as Columbia University, New
York University,139and Cornell University, have placed counselors directly in
residence halls.
An IHE attentive to the issue of student suicide will realize that different
populations of students may require different types of intervention and assistance, and that a close study of its population will inform its policies and
protocols.' 40 Any college's suicide reduction strategy will represent that institution's consideration of many variables, including its available resources
and the specific characteristics of its student body. Moreover, a university's
mental health services program is likely to be among those factors that some
prospective students evaluate in choosing a college.
Restatement section 323 provides a framework to hold IHEs responsible
for the competent management of their suicide prevention protocols while
encouraging IHE attentiveness and the adoption of varied approaches. Given
the importance of IHE attentiveness to issues surrounding student suicide, as
well as the varied approaches IHEs have taken to confront the problem,
courts must allow for population- and college-specific approaches. However,
courts must also hold IHEs responsible for the competent management of
protocols they do choose to adopt. Restatement section 323, Negligent Performance of Undertaking to Render Services, provides such a framework.
The section states:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services
to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the
other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his
undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertak(b) the harm
4
ing.1 1
This "increased risk rule" limits liability to the scope of the risk created by
failure to use due care. If negligent nonperformance causes harm, but the
harm caused is not the result of any increased risk, then liability is inappro-

priate. 142
138.

See id. ("To address the problem, Emory University and the University of North Carolina

are inviting students to fill out anonymous mental health questionnaires.").
139.

Id.

140. SUICIDE PREVENTION RES. CTR., supra note 117, at 9-13 (outlining the differing concerns and needs of various populations, including commuter students, older students, gay and
lesbian students, and international students); Arenson, supra note 30 ("Cornell is making a special
effort to reach out to Asian and Asian-American students. Of 16 students there who have committed
suicide since 1996, 9 were of Asian descent.").
141.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §

323 (1965).

142. See Turbe v. Gov't of Virgin Is., 938 F.2d 427, 432 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Put another way, the
defendant's negligent performance must somehow put the plaintiff in a worse situation than if the
defendant had never begun the performance.").
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Under Restatement section 323, courts should stop short of imposing a
broader duty on IHEs to prevent foreseeable suicide. Instead, courts should
analyze the concept of duty from the narrow perspective of reasonable care
once services are voluntarily undertaken. When a student's health worsens
because the IHE negligently designed its suicide prevention program or an
administrator negligently performed his role in the program, courts could
apply such a theory of liability. This theory of liability may also be appropriate when an IHE fails to continue to provide services upon which the
student had come to reasonably rely. 43 Courts could also hold IHEs liable
for discontinuing services after inducing a student to "forego other opportunities of obtaining assistance."'4
Two courts have already analyzed nonclinician liability for student suicide under Restatement section 323. 45 The year prior to Schieszler, in Jain v.
Iowa, a court granted summary judgment to a college and its nonclinician
administrators where parents sued for negligence by claiming failure to exercise reasonable care to prevent their adult child's suicide. 1 6 The court to
most recently rule on the issue of an IHE's liability for student suicide, in
Mahoney v. Allegheny College, similarly granted summary judgment for the
college. 47 In Jain and Mahoney, the courts declined to hold the college and
its administrators liable under the reasoning of section 323 where no affirmative acts by university employees increased the suicidal student's risk
of harming himself and the suicidal student did not rely 48
to his detriment on
the services gratuitously offered by university personnel.
Importantly, addressing the issue of IHE liability for student suicide under Restatement section 323 solves the problems of imposing a duty, as the
Shin and Schieszler courts did, based on foreseeability alone. 49 There would
be no incentive for administrators to withhold intervention from students in
need because liability under section 323 would not hinge on how much an
administrator knew about a particular student's situation, but rather on
whether the IHE designed and the administrator implemented the protocol
for addressing student mental health problems with reasonable care.' 50 Furthermore, analysis under section 323 would not create an incentive for
nonclinicians to take actions that could be detrimental to a student's overall

143.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 cmt. a.

144.

Id. § 323 cmt. c; see also Jain v. State, 617 N.W.2d 293, 299-300 (Iowa 2000).

145. Jain, 617 N.W.2d at 298-300; see also Mahoney v. Allegheny College, No. AD 8922003, slip op. at 22-23 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Dec. 22, 2005).
146.

617 N.W.2d at 298-300.

147.

No. AD 892-2003, slip op. at 22-23.

148.

Jain, 617 N.W.2d at 298-300; Mahoney, No. AD 892-2003, slip op. at 22-23.

149.

For a discussion of these negative effects, see supra Section II.C.

150.
See Brief of Amici Curiae Brown University et al., supra note 34, at 13 (reasoning that
guided by the Shin court's foreseeability-laden approach, the approach least likely to impose liabil-

ity on college administrators would be to avoid learning about student mental health problems
altogether).
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treatment plan, as formulated by clinicians. 5 ' Instead, it would be in the best
interests of nonclinicians to follow the advice of trained mental health professionals. Evaluating IHE liability for student suicide under Restatement
section 323 would also allow courts to affirm the movement away from the
in loco parentis view of the relationship between IHEs and their students.
Finally, the section 323 approach would provide colleges and universities
the freedom and discretion to implement a suicide prevention program that
is effective for its particular student population. As such, IHEs could maintain respect for college students as adults, rather than being compelled to
jeopardize student privacy and assume a parental role.
B. ProposedIllustrationsto Restatement Sections 314A and 323
To provide guidance to courts and enhance predictability for IHEs dealing with potential liability for student suicide, this Note suggests several
illustrations for addition to Restatement sections 314A and 323. First, the
following illustration to Restatement section 314A will clarify that courts
should not pervert the doctrine of special relationships to impose liability on
nonclinician administrators for student suicide:
A is an enrolled student at B University. C is a dean and D is a resident advisor at B University. C and D become aware of A's suicidal ideations
and/or suicidal threats and foresee that A is a suicide risk. A commits suicide. Assuming no additional facts, C and D are not subject to liability for
A's suicide because C and D were not in a special relationship with A and
did not owe a duty of reasonable care to prevent A's suicide.
Next, the following illustration should be added to Restatement section
323 to address the issue of nonclinicians' liability for student suicide'52:
A is an enrolled student at B University. C is a dean and D is a resident advisor at B University. C and D are made aware of A's suicidal ideations
and/or suicidal threats, and take it upon themselves to help A find a psychologist with whom to meet and seek advice. C and D ensure that an
appointment for A is made with a psychologist several weeks into the future. In the interim, A commits suicide. C and D are subject to liability for
the deterioration of A's mental health status caused by the delay in care if A
decided to forego other opportunities of obtaining assistance in reliance on
C's and D's promised assistance.
Finally, the following illustration should be added to Restatement section 323 regarding the liability of an IHE generally for student suicide:

151. See id. ("[I1t would be far preferable for college's student-life staff to learn of a student's
mental problems, including suicidal thoughts, and encourage him to see an expert mental-health
clinician to address those problems.").
152.

This Note and these proposed illustrations do not purport to eliminate the difficulties

courts will continue to face in determining when an HE has been negligent and when an IHE's

negligence caused a student's suicide. Courts, however, are not unfamiliar with the task of making

judgments on imprecise issues of negligence and causation.

May 20081

Is There a Duty?

1403

A is an enrolled student at B University. Administrators at B University are
made aware of A's suicidal ideations and/or suicidal threats, and convince
A to seek assistance at B's mental health center. B's program is designed
and/or operated in a negligent manner. A commits suicide while receiving
services from and participating in B's program. B University is subject to
liability for the deterioration of A's mental health status that resulted from
B's negligently designed and/or operated mental health program.
In adding these or similar illustrations, the Restatement could guard against
the negative effects of foreseeability-generated duty of care of the Shin and
Schieszler courts, while providing courts with guidance for imposing liability on IHEs and their nonclinician administrators in appropriate
circumstances.
CONCLUSION

Courts should not find that IHE nonclinicians have a duty of care to prevent a foreseeable student suicide. The public policy concerns underlying an
imposition of tort liability weigh against the assignment of such a duty. Instead, courts can utilize the tort doctrine of negligent performance of
undertaking to render services to hold IHEs liable for substandard design
and/or administration of their suicide reduction protocol that directly and
negatively affect a student's risk of suicide. This latter theory of liability can
ensure that IHEs take seriously the issue of student suicide, without creating
perverse consequences or upending the law's abandonment of the in loco
parentis relationship between IHEs and their students. IHEs are in the early
stages of developing effective suicide prevention programs, and the law
should not dictate or distort colleges' assessments of how they may best address the mental health issues of their students. Liability pursuant to
negligent performance of undertaking to render services requires that IHEs
implement and operate any service programs they choose to adopt with due
care, but it leaves sufficient latitude for individual colleges and universities
to explore, develop, and implement effective and feasible suicide reduction
techniques in light of their student body, resources, and overall educational
philosophy.
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